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The “Primary Purpose” of Children’s 
Advocacy Centers: How Ohio v. Clark 
Revolutionized Children’s Hearsay 
 
Andrew Lentz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Will never doubted that what his three-year-old daughter was 
telling him was true.1 He asked her questions again and again— 
careful not to volunteer any leading information—hoping Ashley’s 
story would change. Will hoped he was wrong, that it was a 
mistake, and he had simply misheard Ashley. Then all he would 
have to do is ask one more time, and Will and his wife, Stephanie, 
would realize they misunderstood Ashley, and it would be over. It 
would be a weird way to end the day, but that was all, nothing 
more sinister. But Ashley’s words did not change, and they could 
not be taken back. 
Over several months’ time, Ashley had begun exhibiting 
regressive behaviors. This was unusual, but not alarming  in 
itself. During the car ride home from Will’s parents’ home (Papi 
and Nana), Ashley put into words what she had been saying for 
the past several months. Will was driving when Ashley voiced her 
displeasure with Papi. 
“I don’t like it when Papi hugs and kisses me.” 
Stephanie responded, “Why not?” 
 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2018.  
For my wife and partner in all things, Sara Lentz. I am grateful  for the  
many sacrifices you made throughout this process. For some reason, you 
always believe in me. My soul sings when I am with you. 
1 This is a true story as told by Will. Both parents gave the author 
permission to re-tell their story here. Pseudonyms are used to protect the 
privacy of those involved in the story. 
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“He touched my bottom and it hurts on the inside.” 
“Where did he touch your bottom?” 
“In the front.” 
“Where were you when your bottom was hurt?” 
“In [Ashley’s uncle]’s room, in the big bed.” 
“Who touched your bottom?” Will attempted to clarify. 
“Papi did, and it bleeds.” 
“Where were you?” 
“In [Ashley’s uncle]’s room, and I asked for my brown 
blanket.” 
Periodically, as the night went on, Will and Stephanie asked 
Ashley more about the details of what happened. Despite their 
hopes that Ashley’s story would change into some innocent 
mistake, she remained consistent. Throughout the night, they 
asked her about five times what happened. Ashley reiterated, 
“Papi touches my bottom, I bleed.” At one point, Ashley 
volunteered that she had been wearing her Little Mermaid 
panties, and she fetched them for Will and Stephanie. 
Will woke up the next morning wondering if the next phone 
call he made would tear his family apart, and effectively sever his 
relationship with his dad. His call to the police turned into a 
referral to the local Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC). Things 
moved quickly, but soon became disappointing. Ashley met with a 
forensic interviewer, but did not disclose any abuse during her 
interview. A forensic medical examination was conducted on-site, 
but despite the expertise of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
(SANE), the exam was a horrendous experience for Ashley. 
Unfortunately, the medical exam did not produce any evidence 
about whether or not Ashley was assaulted. The  investigators  
met with Will and Stephanie and told them that without a 
statement from Ashley to the forensic interviewer, there was very 
little that they could do. The investigators attempted to use the 
other tools they had available to them. For instance, a “controlled 
call”2 between Will and his father proved fruitless, and they tried 
to conduct a polygraph examination on Papi, but he refused. Soon 
thereafter, Will received a call from the investigators who told him 
that, without more evidence, they would have to put his case “on 
 
 
2. A controlled call is when a participant agrees to call the suspect 
while an officer listens and records the conversation. 
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delay.”3 
Unlike the criminal justice system, there is not an option to 
put real life “on delay.”4 The purpose of sharing Will’s  family  
story is not to tug at heartstrings; in the realm of child sexual 
abuse, his family’s story is not particularly heinous. The purpose 
is to illustrate how allegations of sexual abuse have almost 
intrinsic power to pull close relationships apart.5 Sexual abuse 
allegations by young children are almost as likely to be against a 
family member as anyone else.6 But the consequences for  a  
parent to listen to his or her child and believe him or her are 
staggering. A parent is faced with a decision to either ignore the 
report of abuse—potentially increasing the chance that his or her 
child will be re-victimized—or report the abuse and face lasting 
relational consequences. The only guidance offered to parents in 
this situation is that reporting abuse is the “right thing to do.”  
But even if a parent reports the abuse to the authorities, obtaining 
justice in criminal court is especially difficult because there is 
often little evidence beyond the child’s initial statement, and 
courts are inherently not child-friendly.7 For example, a criminal 
trial can take a great deal of time; thus, a witness may have to 
wait for multiple days at the courthouse before giving his or her 
testimony. Trials can also be confusing; there are a lot of 
important people there, and some people just sit and watch 
everything you say. Testifying at trial is difficult, even for adults. 
For children, it can be especially paralyzing. Ultimately, a 
caregiver’s option to report abuse feels like a futile exercise that 
requires a public statement about a private, humiliating 
 
 
3. No new information has come to light in the intervening years, so  
the case remains “on delay.” 
4. In the aftermath, Will’s siblings distanced themselves from Papi, and 
within a year Will’s parents had divorced. The family has not had a great 
deal of contact with Papi following the incident. Will and Stephanie have 
since had a son together, and he has never met Papi. 
5. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL 
ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, 
INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000) (finding that 86% of 
offenders of sexual abuse knew the victims before the abuse as either a  
family member or an acquaintance). 
6. Id. (49% of offenders of children under the age of six are family 
members). 
7. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 683 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2013). 
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experience for their entire family.8 
Unfortunately, recent case law has restricted the alternative 
evidentiary methods that were designed to make children’s 
statements admissible at trial.9 In an attempt to refine its 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
significantly narrowed the kinds of child abuse cases that may be 
prosecuted.10 
But questions abound, such as: Is the Sixth Amendment 
working as intended, and does our current system reflect the rules 
as they existed when they were written? Is there any light at the 
end of the tunnel for reticent children who are victims of abuse?  
In Part I of this Comment, I will discuss the concept of 
“testimonial evidence,” and where it originated from. Then I will 
present how the meaning of “testimonial evidence” has evolved 
since Crawford v. Washington11 up until Ohio v. Clark.12 I will 
discuss Clark, and how a few courts have examined evidence in 
child abuse cases post-Clark. In Part II, I will explore an  
exception to the Sixth Amendment for evidence that was 
admissible at the time of the founding. I will then provide 
examples of out-of-court statements made by children around the 
time of the founding. Next, I will compare those statements with 
our current understanding of “testimonial evidence.” In Part III, I 
will apply Clark’s revised test for “testimonial evidence” to 
frontline workers at CACs. I will analyze how the recent iteration 
of the “primary purpose” test will affect how frontline workers 
receive information from the children they serve. In short, this 
Comment aims to look through the lens of recent opinions about 
testimonial evidence and provide advice to frontline workers about 
evidence they may come across in the course of their duties. As a 
result of recent case law, CACs may play a key role in the future 
for obtaining evidence that is admissible at trial. The purpose of 
this Comment is to educate workers whose jobs involve working 
 
8. The term “caregiver” is used throughout this Comment to refer to an 
adult who provides support for the daily living of another. 
9. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
10. When the Supreme Court declares a procedural requirement for all 
accusations as “a crucible,” it is unsurprising that it disproportionately  
affects children. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. Few crucibles are child- 
friendly. 
11. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
12. 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). 
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with suspected victims of child maltreatment about recent cases 
that will influence the performance of their jobs, and to 
demonstrate that many statements, although made by a child, 
might not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
I. HISTORY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
A. Introducing “Testimonial Evidence” (Crawford, Davis, and 
Bryant) 
In 2004, the landscape of the Sixth Amendment shifted 
considerably. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation  Clause 
states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”13 Prior 
to 2004, Ohio v. Roberts admitted out-of-court statements made by 
an unavailable witness if those statements showed an “adequate 
‘indicia of reliability.’”14 While Roberts was the standard for 
twenty-four years, it often granted serenity at the cost of 
consistency.15 
In an effort to return the Amendment back to its original 
purpose, the Supreme Court adopted a different approach16 in 
Crawford v. Washington.17 Crawford declared that “witnesses”  
are those “who ‘bear testimony,’” and “testimony” is a “solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.”18 Crawford held that testimonial  evidence 
was excluded unless the witness was “unavailable to testify, and 
 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
14. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
15. Id. at 66; compare United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., 
259 F.3d 229, 245 (2001) (where the Fourth Circuit found an incriminating 
statement more reliable because it was “fleeting”), with People v. Farrell, 34 
P.3d 401, 406–07 (Colo. 2001) (where the Colorado Supreme Court applied an 
eight-factor test and found a statement that incriminated the defendant more 
reliable because it was “detailed”), and Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 
367, 371–72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (where the court considered a statement to 
be more reliable because the witness was charged with a crime and in 
custody), with State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) 
(where the court found a statement to be more reliable because the witness 
was neither a suspect nor charged with a crime). 
16. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
That phrase may sound mild, but this new approach marked a significant 
change in the law of evidence. 
17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
18. Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
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the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”19 
While Crawford explained the basis for the new test, it did 
precious little to offer guidance on how to determine if statements 
are “testimonial” beyond including, at a minimum, “prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.”20 
Just two years later, the Supreme Court revisited 
“testimonial” statements when it considered two consolidated 
cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.21 In an  
effort to clarify what “testimonial” meant, the Court announced: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.22 
But while the Court refined our understanding of 
“testimonial” evidence in Davis, the Court’s analysis was 
imperfect.23 The focus was supposed to be on the “primary 
purpose” test, but the Court must have felt that there was too 
 
 
19. Id. at 54. 
20. See id. at 62, 68. 
21. See 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
22. Id. at 822 (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned that statements 
made to a 911 operator while a victim was under attack were nontestimonial, 
but verbal and written statements to a police officer after a victim suffered a 
violent attack from her boyfriend were testimonial, and thus inadmissible. 
Notably, there was no consideration of whether the victim in Hammon was 
still in an emergency situation. See id. at 829–30.  The majority reasoned  
that the attack was over by the time the officer arrived, so there was “no 
immediate threat to [the victim’s] person.” Id. Only Justice Thomas called 
into question whether the attacker posed an ongoing threat to his wife. Id. at 
841 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This 
suggestion seemed to gain traction in Ohio v. Clark because whether the  
child would be safe in the home with the attacker played an important role in 
the Court’s decision. See 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). One wonders if the 
victim’s statements to the police in Hammon would still be considered 
testimonial after Clark. 
23. See 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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much discussion about “ongoing emergency” because the Court 
accepted Michigan v. Bryant five years later.24 In an effort to 
refocus the analysis on the primary purpose of the out-of-court 
statements, the Court in Bryant ruled, “the existence vel non of an 
ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial 
inquiry.”25 The Court stressed that an ongoing emergency is 
“simply one factor” when evaluating the “primary purpose” and 
that the inquiry must consider “all of the relevant 
circumstances.”26 The relevant circumstances that the Court 
considered in Bryant included the formality of the questioning and 
whether the statements would conform to any of the standard 
rules of hearsay, which are “designed to identify some statements 
as reliable.”27 For the Court, the ultimate question was “whether, 
in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary 
purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony.’”28 Therefore, the primary purpose 
test is objective. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized other exceptions to 
the Confrontation Clause separate from the “primary purpose” 
test. Crawford v. Washington held that the Confrontation Clause 
would not hold up to exceptions that were “established at the time 
of the founding.”29 The Court explores this further in Giles v. 
California, spending nearly as much time analyzing English 
common law as modern law.30 One of the exceptions the Court 
discusses is forfeiture by wrongdoing, where the witness is absent 
because the defendant engaged in conduct to prevent the witness 
from testifying.31 The other exception is a dying declaration, 
“when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive to 
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most 
 
 
24. See 562 U.S. 344, 374 (2011) (second emphasis added). 
25. Id. (emphasis added). 
26. Id. at 366, 369. 
27. Id. at 377, 358–59. 
28.  Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 358) (alteration in original). Unsurprisingly, the Court found that the 
statements made to responding police officers were “nontestimonial” when 
made by a victim dying of a gunshot wound in a gas station parking lot. See 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 378. 
29. See 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
30. See 554 U.S. 353, 362–64 (2008). 
31. See id. at 359. 
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powerful considerations to speak the truth.”32 The Court 
ultimately decided not to admit the State’s evidence explicitly 
because it was “not an exception established at the time of the 
founding.”33 Therefore, there are at least two ways in which out- 
of-court statements will not violate the Sixth Amendment and 
thus may be admitted post-Crawford.  First, the statements can  
be admitted if they are deemed nontestimonial.34 Second, the 
statements may be admitted if they fit into exceptions that are 
“established at the time of the founding.”35 
B. Children and Testimonial Evidence: Clark’s Impact on the 
Sixth Amendment 
Up to this point, all of the statements that the Court 
examined for their testimonial value were made to law 
enforcement officers, while potentially testimonial statements 
made to private individuals were never considered before the 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.36 This changed when the Court 
heard Ohio v. Clark.37 A three-year-old boy went to preschool  
with a left eye that appeared bloodshot.38 His teacher asked the 
child what happened and the child did not respond initially.39 
Under closer inspection, the teacher noticed red marks on the 
boy’s face and called over the lead teacher.40 The lead teacher 
asked the child, “Who did this? What happened to you?”41 The 
child responded with something that sounded like “Dee, Dee.”42 
The teacher further inquired whether Dee was “big or little,” and 
 
 
 
32. Id. at 397 (citations omitted). 
33. Id. at 366 (quotations omitted). 
34. See 541 U.S. at 50–53. 
35. Id. at 54. 
36. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. While the 911 
operator in Davis might not have been the police, the Court considered the 
operator to be an agent of the police for the purposes of the opinion; without 
deciding whether she was considered law enforcement. See 547 U.S. at 823 
n.2. 
37. See 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). 
38. Id. at 2178. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
 2018] TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND CHILDREN 273 
 
the child answered that “Dee is big.”43 The teacher called the  
child abuse hotline when she found more injuries under the child’s 
shirt.44 The child’s caretaker—who went by the nickname “Dee”— 
arrived at the school later to pick up the child and denied causing 
the injuries.45 Dee quickly took the child and left the school, but a 
social worker tracked them down the next day.46 The child and  
his sister were examined, and a physician at a nearby hospital 
discovered multiple injuries on the young boy and his sister, 
suggesting child abuse.47 Dee was indicted for five counts of 
felonious assault, two counts of endangering children, and two 
counts of domestic violence.48 At trial, the child victim did not 
testify, but the State introduced the statements made to his 
teachers as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.49 The defendant 
moved to exclude the out-of-court statements, but the trial court 
denied the motion and the jury found the defendant guilty on all 
but one count.50 
The Supreme Court determined that, while statements to 
individuals who are not law enforcement officers are not 
categorically excluded from the Sixth Amendment’s reach, “such 
statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements 
to law enforcement officers.”51 The Court separated private 
individuals from law enforcement officers because they are 
“someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and 
prosecuting criminal behavior.”52 
The Court found that the questions about what happened 
were asked by the teacher to determine to whom it was safe to 
release the abused child; therefore, the statement was made 
during an ongoing emergency.53 The Court specifically dismissed 
 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. The jury found Clark not guilty on only one of the assault counts 
related to A.T. Id. 
51. Id. at 2181. 
52. Id. at 2182. 
53. Id. at 2181–82. Contra Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006). 
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an argument that the intention to report the abuse—or the fact 
that the information could be used in future prosecution—should 
cause the statements to be considered “testimonial.”54 The Court 
also found that the conversation between the child and his 
teachers was an informal, spontaneous conversation; and that the 
child’s age nearly precluded the possibility that his statements 
could be testimonial.55 Therefore, from an objective perspective, 
the primary purpose of the child’s statements were not to provide 
evidence for future litigation.56 Every Justice agreed in judgment, 
and six Justices joined in the opinion of the Court.57 Further, the 
Court went out of its way to express support for a historical 
argument that similar statements would have been admissible at 
common law.58 The Court’s inclusion of dicta supporting another 
theory about how this kind of testimony does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause shows the Court’s confidence in allowing 
this kind of evidence.59 Significantly, Justice Scalia not only 
agreed with the majority’s analysis of the primary purpose, 
common law acceptance, testimonial purpose of a very young 
child, and analysis of the effect of mandated reporting laws on 
private individuals, but also wrote a concurring opinion 
emphasizing his agreement.60 
C. Post-Clark Decisions: Ward and Barker 
Since announcing the decision in Clark, there have been few 
appellate decisions across the country that have applied Clark in 
cases involving domestic violence. These cases provide a 
 
 
54. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183 (finding that mandated reporting laws 
alone did not turn a teacher into an agent of the state, and that any good 
teacher would have acted in the same way without mandated reporting laws 
in place). 
55. See id. at 2181–82. 
56. See id. at 2182. 
57. See id. at 2177. 
58. See id. at 2182 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The 
History of Children’s Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L. J. 
1029, 1030 (2007)). Because the Court found the statement nontestimonial 
under the “primary purpose” test, it was not necessary to explore the common 
law argument. 
59. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182 (citations omitted). 
60. See id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring). While a concurring 
opinion is not authoritative, it is hard to overstate the power of a concurring 
opinion from the progenitor of the analytical framework that will be changed. 
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particularly clear perspective into how the courts will view 
testimonial evidence involving child abuse in the future. An 
analysis of post-Clark decisions proves particularly interesting in 
cases involving forensic nurses because of the ambiguity present 
in the performance of their job. Two cases serve as a barometer  
for how Clark will be interpreted in the future: Ward v. State61 
and United States v. Barker.62 Ward involved a victim of domestic 
violence who was dropped off at her parents’ home by her 
abuser.63 The victim’s parents called emergency services  after 
they saw the extent of her injuries.64 When the paramedic  
arrived, the responding police officer left the room and the victim 
disclosed that her boyfriend caused the injuries.65 The victim was 
transported to the hospital and evaluated by a forensic nurse who 
asked her what had happened.66 The victim reported that it was 
her boyfriend, the defendant, who beat her multiple times with a 
belt.67 The Indiana Supreme Court found that the statements to 
the paramedic and the forensic nurse were both nontestimonial.68 
Barker involved a SANE nurse who testified about a four and a 
half year old’s disclosure of sexual abuse to her during a medical 
exam.69 The court determined that the child’s statements to the 
nurse were also nontestimonial and admissible.70 
While both courts decided that the statements made to 
forensic nurses were nontestimonial, they arrived at those 
conclusions in different ways.71 Both courts evaluated the 
questioners’ roles and the medical relevancy of the questions.72 
However, the similarities end there. While both discuss “ongoing 
emergency” as a factor,73 Ward dismisses an argument that the 
emergency was over because the assault occurred hours before 
 
61. 50 N.E.3d 752 (Ind. 2016). 
62. 820 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2016). 
63. 50 N.E.3d at 754. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
68. Id. at 764. 
69. United States v. Barker, 820 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2016). See infra 
note 131. 
70. Id. at 172. 
71. See id. at 171–72; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 753. 
72. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 171–72; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 761–62. 
73. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 171; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 758. 
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medical treatment was obtained.74 Instead, Ward sidesteps the 
issue as nonessential to deciding the case,75 and Barker finds an 
ongoing emergency.76 Ward interprets Bryant to mean that 
because there may be other circumstances, besides an ongoing 
emergency, where a statement is made without the primary 
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for testimony, an 
ongoing emergency is unnecessary.77 Ward looks to other factors, 
like the condition of the victim and the formality of the 
conversation, to determine the primary purpose.78 Barker also 
distinguishes the hospital room setting from a formal location, 
such as a law enforcement interrogation.79 Moreover, Barker 
considers, but dismisses, any argument that the principal purpose 
for the nurse’s questions was evidence collection.80 Ward finds the 
nurse’s questions satisfied the “primary purpose” test because 
they were useful for diagnosis and safety planning.81 Notably, 
Ward is not dissuaded by the fact that the nurse acquired 
informed consent from the victim—in writing—which permitted, 
but did not compel, her to disclose the information to law 
enforcement if requested.82 
 
74. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 760 n.2. 
75. See id. at 760 (“[T]here may be other circumstances, aside from 
ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary 
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” (quoting 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011))). 
76. Barker, 820 F.3d at 171. 
77. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 760. 
78. See id. 
79. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172. More analysis on this point by the court 
would have been greatly appreciated. There are formal elements to a 
hospital, such as that appointments are made there, highly educated people 
work there, and security personnel are employed there. However, there are 
also informal aspects, such as the absence of a dress code and that 
appointments are nonessential for certain departments. Instead, the court 
nakedly finds that “a hospital emergency room . . . [is] a more formal 
environment than a preschool lunchroom.” Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See 50 N.E.3d at 762–63. The court finds these questions consistent 
with the hospital’s primary goal; “a hospital’s duty of care to a patient who 
presents observable signs of domestic abuse includes some reasonable 
measures to address the patient’s risk.” Id. at 763 (quoting McSwane v. 
Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. 2009)). 
82. Id. at 763. Up until this point, the biggest difference between 
Hammon v. Indiana and the other cases is that the emergency was over, and 
a written statement was taken. See 547 U.S. 813, 814–15 (2006). In Ward, 
the forensic nurse obtained consent in writing, and the assault had occurred 
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What emerge as key factors in both cases are the identity of 
the questioner, as well as some rational connection between the 
questions and a non-prosecutorial purpose.83 Both cases 
demonstrate testimonial analysis post-Clark, and can serve as a 
predictor for how courts may interpret Clark in the future.84 
However, the Supreme Court also mentions a possibility for 
allowing evidence that has its roots grounded in the past.85 
II. CHILD ABUSE HEARSAY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Confrontation 
Clause “does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court 
statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at 
the time of the founding.”86 Clark applies Giles to carve out a 
special exception to the Confrontation Clause for children’s 
statements about child abuse that ordinarily would be deemed 
hearsay.87 Importantly, both the Clark majority and concurring 
opinion cite with approval to an article analyzing the common law 
approach to hearsay regarding child abuse allegations.88  
However, the majority goes further.89 In dicta, the Court opines 
that the statements made by the victim likely would have been 
admissible at common law, and that “[i]t is thus highly doubtful 
that statements like [the victim]’s ever would have been 
understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns.”90 The 
 
 
hours before. See 50 N.E.3d at 763. According to this analysis, the main 
difference in Hammon was the identity of the questioner, or simply the 
testimonial analysis has changed. See 547 U.S. at 815. Little else seems 
substantially different. 
83. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 763. 
84. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 763. 
85. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (citing Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008)). 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 2182. 
88. See id. at 2181; id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lyon & LaMagna, 
supra note 58, at 1029. 
89. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (opining in dicta that no previous case law 
has amounted to an assertion that defendants must provide “evidence that 
the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require the 
exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the 
time of the founding.”). 
90. Id. at 2182. 
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Supreme Court cites approvingly to King v. Brasier, in which an 
English court ruled that a child’s statements to her mother should 
have been excluded—not because the statements were 
inadmissible—but because the child was competent to testify, yet 
she did not.91 Therefore, Brasier stands to mean that if a child  
was unavailable to testify, then his or her statements could be 
heard.92 Thus, the statements were not considered a violation of 
the hearsay rules. The Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP) shed 
more light on trial practice in England in the eighteenth 
century.93 For instance, in Ketteridge a child was unable to  
testify, so her mother was sworn in.94 The mother was allowed to 
testify about what her daughter disclosed to her about the 
defendant’s identity, actions, and about the child’s statements 
made in an initial court appearance.95 Importantly, Ketteridge  
was adjudicated in September, while Brasier was decided in April, 
only a few months prior.96 Therefore, even though Brasier 
excluded some testimony by a parent about her child’s statements 
concerning abuse, it did not categorically exclude hearsay 
testimony by parents.97 Additionally, in 1775, in a different child 
abuse trial, the court allowed an alleged victim’s mother to testify 
extensively about her child’s statements without the child 
testifying.98 The mother testified as to what the child told her, 
specifically how the defendant allegedly sexually abused the child, 
where the alleged abuse occurred, how many times, and when it 
happened.99 The defendant objected to the mother’s testimony as 
 
 
91. See id. at 2182 (citing King v. Brasier (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 
(K.B.)). 
92. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203. 
93. The OBSP are a collection of 197,745 criminal trials held in a court 
in London spanning from 1674 to 1913. THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS 
ONLINE, 1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17, 
2017). 
94. Trial of Charles Ketteridge, THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE, 
1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17, 2017) 
(search reference number t17790915-18 in “search the proceedings” engine). 
95. Id. 
96. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202; Trial of Charles Ketteridge, supra note 
94. 
97. See Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202. 
98. See Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 58, at 1036–37 (citing Rex v. 
Powell (1775) 168 Eng. Rep. 157 (K.B.)). 
99. See id. 
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unreliable because the statements were not taken under oath.100 
However, the court ruled against the defendant’s objection and 
admitted the hearsay from the mother.101 Nevertheless, these are 
just two cases among many others from that time.102 They show 
that out-of-court statements by children about abuse were 
routinely admitted in criminal cases in eighteenth century  
English courts. Therefore, statements like these fit the narrow 
category discussed in Giles.103 So, even if statements like these 
were considered testimonial under the “primary purpose” test, 
there is evidence that the Court believes such statements should 
still be admitted as evidence because they are simply immune to 
the Confrontation Clause.104 Thus, Clark stands for allowing 
statements from children to another regarding abuse as not 
testimonial through the primary purpose test and also because 
they may not violate the Confrontation Clause.105 The only 
remaining obstacle is hearsay. To better understand the impact 
that all of this will have on child abuse investigations, 
understanding CACs and their role in investigations is 
imperative. Therefore, a general explanation of CACs is  
important to understand how testimonial evidence fits in child 
abuse investigations, and how Clark has fundamentally changed 
the landscape of child abuse investigations and prosecution. 
III. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE CHILDREN’S 
ADVOCACY CENTER 
The problems are legion when attempting to prosecute a 
sexual abuse case involving a minor.106 In fact, it is hard to 
imagine a more difficult evidentiary scenario than the generic 
 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. See, e.g., Trial of Joseph Fyson, THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS 
ONLINE, 1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17, 
2017). 
103. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008). 
104. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
105. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180–81 (2015). 
106. See, e.g., Laurie Shanks, Child Sexual Abuse: Moving Toward a 
Balanced and Rational Approach to the Cases Everyone Abhors, 34 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 517, 522–23 (2011); Dione Marie Enea, Justice for Our 
Children: New Jersey Addresses Evidentiary Problems Inherent in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2030, 2031 (1994). 
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child sexual abuse case. Typically, the abuse happens in private, 
and the offender requires no extra equipment or tools to commit 
the crime. Often, there is no documentation, paper trail, online 
activity, phone tower pings, or any other trackable activity, and no 
other witness besides the victim.107 Evidence of trauma to the 
victim or other medical findings are rare,108 and evidence at the 
scene of the crime can be easily cleaned up without suspicion. 
Evidence at trial may be only the perpetrator’s story against the 
victim’s. Victims of sexual abuse are often not ideal witnesses 
because they are more likely to suffer from high anxiety, post- 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), poor self-esteem,  and 
behavioral issues.109  Moreover, it can take several years for a  
case to go to trial. The long wait affects children more  
significantly than adults because a two-year wait is a 
proportionately shorter time for a thirty-year-old than a ten-year- 
old.110 The myriad of agencies involved in child abuse 
investigations further complicate the process. An investigation  
can involve schools, pediatricians, mental health professionals, 
local law enforcement, child welfare organizations, and a 
prosecutor’s office. All these organizations have their own 
competing interests and goals.111 
To combat the problems inherent in a child abuse 
investigation, Bud Cramer—a prosecutor from Alabama—founded 
 
 
 
107. See Enea, supra note 106, at 2031. 
108. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR MEDICO-LEGAL CARE FOR 
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 78–80 (2003), 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/resources/publications/en/guid 
elines_chap7.pdf. 
109. See Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett, Linda Meyer Williams, & David 
Finklehor, Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of 
Recent Empirical Studies, 113 AM. PSYCHOL. STUD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 165– 
67 (1993). 
110. A two-year wait is only one-fifteenth of the lifetime of a thirty-year- 
old, while that same wait is one-fifth of the life of a ten-year-old. Further, an 
adult has finished development, while a child is still developing emotionally, 
cognitively, and physically. Therefore, two years covers much more ground  
for a ten-year-old than a thirty-year-old. 
111. For instance, a school will want the child back in class, while law 
enforcement may need the child for investigatory purposes. The Department 
of Human Services will work toward reunification of the family, while the 
prosecutor, pediatrician, and law enforcement may want to keep the family 
apart. 
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the first multi-disciplinary team (MDT) and CAC in 1985.112 An 
MDT is a group of professionals who agree to work alongside each 
other on child abuse cases. Typically, cases involving child abuse 
involve multiple agencies such as: the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Human Services, law enforcement, mental health 
providers, victim advocates, and others. To reduce needlessly 
duplicative work and re-interviewing of victims and witnesses, 
agencies formed MDTs to encourage greater efficiency for their 
cases and to improve the family’s experience throughout the 
investigation process.113 Importantly, these agencies work 
together even though their goals might be different. One agency 
might be focused on reunifying the family, while another might 
believe keeping the family apart is best. 
From that first CAC established in Alabama, an entire model 
was developed for these centers, and now there are 822 CACs 
nationwide who served 324,602 children in 2016.114 CACs are 
child-friendly facilities that bring all the agencies involved with 
child abuse cases under one roof.115 CACs work with children and 
families who were exposed to violence by offering services such as: 
child advocacy, forensic interviewing, medical treatment, and 
therapeutic services.116 By providing services to families and 
investigative agencies, CACs serve as neutral, third-party 
organizations that offer support to the community. While  the 
CAC model was developed by a prosecutor and most CACs share 
information with prosecutors, CACs are not investigatory agencies 
and do not conduct investigations of their own.117 
Generally, the CAC becomes involved in situations where 
abuse is suspected early in the process.118 The first step in a child 
 
112. NAT’L CHILD.’S ADVOC. CTR., http://www.nationalcac.org/history/ (last 
visited Sep. 17, 2017). 
113. See NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS 12 
(2017), http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ 
NCA-Standards-for-Accredited-Members-2017.pdf. 
114. NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/ (last 
visited Sep. 17, 2017). 
115. NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., SNAPSHOT 2017: ADVOCACY, EFFICACY, AND 
FUNDING IN CACS 3–4 (2016), http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/sites/ 
default/files/downloads/Snapshot-2017.pdf. 
116. Id. 
117. See id. 
118. The following information about the early response process is a 
generalization of a nationwide process that the author learned about during 
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abuse investigation is the initial report. This happens in many 
ways, but reports of abuse either from a teacher, police officer, or 
otherwise somehow eventually find their way to a child abuse 
hotline. If the report is accepted for investigation, the information 
will be sent to either child protective services, law enforcement, or 
both, and an investigation will be initiated. At this point, the 
investigators refer the child and his or her caregivers to the CAC, 
and set up an appointment for whatever services are appropriate. 
Those services might be a forensic interview, child advocacy, 
medical examination, crisis intervention, or something else 
depending on each individual CAC. After the visit to the CAC, the 
investigation continues, and the child may never return to the 
CAC again.119 Because the CAC’s role begins so early in the 
investigation process, the events that brought the child there are 
relatively fresh. The purpose of discussing the ways in which CAC 
staff members may be able to acquire forensic evidence is not to 
change the focus of their jobs. But CAC employees should be 
aware of ways in which they may come across evidence that may 
be nontestimonial—or even not excluded by the hearsay rule— 
while they go about the usual requirements of their jobs. 
A. Child Advocates 
Like any advocate, a child advocate’s job is somewhat 
amorphous. Advocates are asked to support the child or family in 
many different ways, which is largely dictated by the needs of 
those specific people. With that in mind, a guide is helpful to 
explain the duties of an advocate and the other roles at CACs.  
The National Children’s Alliance (NCA) is the body that 
establishes accreditation standards for all CACs across the 
country, which are used to understand the requirements of each 
position.120 The purpose of the child advocate is to provide  
support to the child or caregiver by coordinating services through 
the CAC or outside agencies and to provide up-to-date information 
 
 
his experience working for a CAC. A visual depiction of the investigation 
process is available at: http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/cac-model. 
119. See, e.g., DAY ONE R.I., CHILD.’S ADVOC. CTR., MULTI-DISCIPLINARY 
TEAM (MDT) PROTOCOL 5–6 (2012), https://www.dayoneri.org/sites/default/ 
files/site-content/pdfs/MDT%20Protocol%202012%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
120. STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 6, 20. 
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on the investigation.121 Child advocates provide—among other 
services—crisis intervention, risk assessment, safety planning, 
education, and courtroom support, if necessary.122 While 
interacting with clients at the CAC, advocates can be the 
recipients of spontaneous disclosures of abuse, but advocates can 
also elicit disclosures from their clients. However, using the 
“primary purpose” test demonstrates that neither of those 
disclosures should be considered testimonial evidence.123 
Under the “primary purpose” test, evidence is testimonial if 
“the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”124 
A child advocate may need to ask the child questions that could 
lead to statements about abuse in order to provide services like 
safety planning, risk assessment, or referrals to outside agencies. 
For instance, the advocate may ask about familial relationships at 
home in an effort to understand family dynamics or to determine 
appropriate therapeutic referrals. If the child makes a subsequent 
disclosure of abuse by one of those family members, that does not 
change the primary purpose of the question by the advocate. 
Further, “all relevant circumstances” must be considered to 
determine the primary purpose of the statements, and the 
informality of the situation or the presence of an ongoing 
emergency are some of the pertinent factors.125 A child advocate’s 
meeting with the child or caregivers at the CAC is a casual 
conversation.126 The CAC building itself is child-friendly and 
informal, and the conversation is not video or audio recorded.127 
There are no specific requirements for those conversations.128 
Further, a child advocate is not a law enforcement officer, so 
statements to an advocate are “much less likely to be 
testimonial.”129 Determining whether an ongoing emergency 
exists will be case specific because sometimes children are rushed 
 
121. See id. at 25. 
122. See id. at 26–27. 
123. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180–81 (2015). 
124. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
125. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (2015). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 15, 25– 
28. 
129. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181. 
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to the CAC within hours of the abuse, though in some cases, a 
child comes to a CAC years after the abuse.  Thus, looking at  
these factors together, a conversation between a child, his or her 
caregivers, and an advocate—even if that advocate asks questions 
that cause disclosures of abuse from the child—is not primarily for 
“creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”130 
Therefore, advocates should feel free to ask questions that are 
related to the goals of their job, knowing that the information 
provided by victims is nontestimonial. 
B. SANE Nurses131 
Given that nurses are more ubiquitous than other CAC 
positions, their primary role is more easily understood. Moreover, 
nurses who also obtain evidence during the course of their 
treatment have been examined by a few courts after Clark and 
survived scrutiny.132 In Barker, the court determined “[t]he 
primary purpose of the conversation between [the SANE nurse] 
and [the victim] was to medically evaluate and treat the young 
girl.”133 Therefore, the circumstances of the abuse were relevant 
for the nurse’s questioning for determining if the child would be 
discharged into the child abuser’s custody.134 The court found  
that a hospital emergency room had some formality associated 
with it, but did not rise to the level of a police interrogation.135 
Furthermore, the court found a nurse/patient relationship differed 
significantly from a citizen/police relationship.136 Ultimately, the 
court ruled that the “[nurse’s] SANE certification did not convert 
the essential purpose of her conversation with [victim] from 
medical evaluation and treatment to evidence collection, though it 
may have tended to lead to Barker’s prosecution.”137 In Ward, the 
 
 
130. See id. at 2180 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006)). 
131. For clarity sake, SANE nurses are a specific type of forensic nurse. 
There is little difference in this context, so the terms should be read 
interchangeably. 
132. See United States v. Barker, 820 F.3d 167, 172 (2016); Ward v. State, 
50 N.E.3d 752, 760–61 (2016). 
133. Barker, 820 F.3d at 171. 
134. Id. 
135. See id. at 172. 
136. See id. 
137. Id. 
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court ruled that a forensic nurse’s auxiliary purpose of finding 
evidence did not make the victim’s statements to her nurse 
testimonial.138 A forensic nurse at a CAC is no  different. 
However, Ward has one admonition about testimonial hearsay 
and interviews with forensic nurses.139 Ward warns against 
strategically using a medical interview as a “pretext[]” and 
“backdoor for admitting what is really testimonial hearsay.”140 
This seems like an obvious point, but the application may be 
easier said than done. 
Consider State v. McLaughlin, where a fifteen-year-old boy 
made allegations of sexual abuse against a family friend.141 The 
child went to a local CAC and had a medical interview and 
evaluation with a registered nurse before having a medical 
examination with a doctor.142 The initial medical interview was 
video and audio recorded, and the child disclosed, among other 
things, details of his sexual abuse, the identity of the abuser, and 
places where the abuse occurred.143 The recording of the  
interview was later introduced into evidence.144 Over objections 
based on the Confrontation Clause, the trial court admitted the 
evidence and the appellate court upheld the ruling.145 In 
examining the surrounding circumstances, the appellate court 
found that the age of the child—fifteen—did not mean that he 
would reasonably know that his statements might be later used at 
trial.146 Moreover, the primary purpose of the nurse’s questions 
was the victim’s physical health, mental health, and safety.147 
 
 
138. Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 760 (2016) (“medically relevant 
information is not transformed into ‘testimony’ when it is reported to a 
forensic nurse instead of a paramedic.”). 
139. See id. at 764. 
140. Id. 
141. See 786 S.E.2d 269, 273–74 (N.C. App. 2016). 
142. See id. at 274. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 275. 
145. See id. at 283. 
146. See id. at 281; see also State v. Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498, 506–07 
(N.C. App. 2006) (holding that a reasonable child under the age of three 
“would [not] know or should [not] know that his statements might later be 
used at trial.”). 
147. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d at 281. The court held that knowing what 
had happened was useful to “make sure [the victim] did not have any 
diseases or other issues that could affect him for the rest of his life.” Id. 
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Questions posed by the nurse that were not pertinent to medical 
diagnosis were admitted because they were useful for establishing 
rapport and the importance of honest answers to sensitive 
questions.148 Importantly, the court invoked the Supreme Court’s 
broad definition of an “ongoing emergency” in Clark and deemed 
the nurse’s questions as necessary to determine, among other 
things, how to protect someone else from child sexual abuse.149 
Because the questions were asked during an ongoing emergency 
and were primarily about protecting a child, they were considered 
nontestimonial.150 As such, under this interpretation of 
testimonial evidence, a nurse’s questions are admissible under two 
circumstances: first, if the questions are related to the physical 
and mental well-being of a child, and second, if the questions are 
not medically related, but are important for establishing a rapport 
with the victim.151 It is not even determinative that the nurse 
knew her interview would be turned over to law enforcement 
because the “primary purpose” test turns on whether the 
interviewer’s primary purpose was to create a substitute for in- 
court testimony.152 Moreover, a nurse’s primary function is not to 
collect evidence.153 A forensic nurse is not assigned to uncover  
and prosecute criminal behavior; therefore, statements made to 
her are “significantly less likely to be testimonial.”154 This 
language gives wide latitude to nurses in North Carolina, and 
ammunition to prosecutors everywhere. No matter where a nurse 
practices, the initial post-Clark judicial responses strongly 
indicate victim statements made to a medical professional are 
likely to be considered nontestimonial. Prosecutors should not be 
concerned about the admissibility of statements made by patients 
of SANE nurses at CACs, even if a nurse asks detailed questions 
about abuse. 
 
 
148. See id. at 281. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. Further, it was not hearsay, but hearsay is not the focus of 
this Comment. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 282. 
153. See INT’L ASS’N OF FORENSIC NURSES, http://www.forensicnurses.org/ 
?page=whatisfn (last visited Sep. 17, 2017) (“Forensic nurses are nurses first 
and foremost.”). 
154. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015). 
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C. Forensic Interviewers 
A forensic interviewer is someone who talks to a suspected 
child abuse victim. Forensic interviewers have  specialized 
training for how to question children in ways that are non-leading 
and developmentally appropriate. Depending on the jurisdiction, 
forensic interviewers might have an advanced degree or a 
bachelor’s degree, and may work as an interviewer full or part 
time. Forensic interviews tend to be conversational, meaning they 
are not scripted. When it comes to eliciting nontestimonial 
evidence, forensic interviewers have not fared as well as SANE 
nurses post-Clark.155 And forensic interviews certainly were not 
welcomed by the courts with open arms before Clark.156  There  
are two main reasons why forensic interviews have typically 
produced statements that courts have categorized as testimonial. 
First, many decisions about interviews came before Clark and 
second, courts often misunderstood the role of forensic 
interviewers. Clark changed the formulation for determining if 
evidence is testimonial, and it reduced what information is 
considered testimonial.157 Therefore, guidelines for what 
constitutes nontestimonial evidence was stricter before Clark. 
Second, a misunderstanding of forensic interviewers’ roles is an 
understandable mistake. Forensic interviewing is an esoteric job. 
Even within interviewing, different interviewers may have 
different ideas about how to best fulfill their duties. Within any 
occupation, workers may believe, correctly or not, that certain 
responsibilities are more important than others. For instance, in 
State v. Bentley, a child asked a forensic interviewer if she could 
stop the interview.158 The interviewer refused, and told the child, 
 
155. See In the Interest of J.C., 877 N.W.2d 447, 458 (Iowa 2016) (where 
the Iowa Supreme Court assumed that a forensic interview violated the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights because it was called a “forensic 
interview,” the referral came from law enforcement, and the interview was 
recorded). 
156. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577, 579 (Colo. App. 2006) 
(videotaped interview with forensic interview deemed testimonial); State v. 
Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2007) (interview by counselor observed 
by law enforcement ruled testimonial); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 564 
(N.D. 2006) (statements to private forensic interviewer who was working  
with police were testimonial). 
157. See 135 S. Ct. 2173. 
158. 739 N.W.2d at 300. 
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“it’s just really important the police know about everything that 
happened.”159 Even worse, the interviewer asked for additional 
details because the police were “probably going to want to know 
just a little bit more.”160 When courts encounter a forensic 
interviewer who presents her role like the one in Bentley did, it is 
reasonable for the court to conclude that the primary purpose of 
forensic interviews is to investigate solely on behalf of the 
police.161 However, that is not an accurate representation of a 
forensic interviewer. The NCA explains that a forensic 
interviewer’s responsibility is “to obtain information from a child 
about abuse allegations that will support accurate and fair 
decision making by the MDT within the criminal justice, child 
protection, and service delivery systems.”162 Therefore, while it is 
true that part of the function of an interviewer is investigative, 
the NCA’s definition supports a broader scope for the job. The 
NCA’s definition may allow the MDT to make fair and accurate 
decisions that only pertain to child protection and service delivery 
for the child. A forensic interviewer can conduct an interview that 
disregards the criminal justice aspect of the MDT. Further, to 
have an investigative component to their responsibilities does not 
mean that forensic interviews should be categorically considered 
testimonial. As has been the case since Davis v. Washington, the 
“primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”163 Prosecution 
is not the ultimate goal for a CAC or a forensic interview. The  
best expression of this main goal is from CornerHouse, one of the 
premier international organizations assisting CACs.164 
CornerHouse advocates the “Child First Philosophy”: “The child is 
our first priority. Not the needs of the family. Not the child’s 
‘story.’ Not the evidence. Not the needs of the courts. Not the 
needs of police, child protection, attorneys, etc. The child is our 
first priority.”165 Therefore, the forensic interviewer also collects 
information for service referrals, to determine if the child is safe, 
 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 20. 
163. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added). 
164. CORNERHOUSE, http://www.cornerhousemn.org/about.html (last 
visited Sep. 17, 2017). 
165. Id. 
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and whether it is safe to release the child to their guardian. This 
is substantively the same reasoning the Court used to justify the 
teachers’ questions in Clark.166 That forensic interviewers’ 
questions have a natural tendency to result in prosecutions is 
“irrelevant.”167 Even though an interviewer knows  the 
information might be used in court, the statements do not become 
testimonial. Forensic interviewers could be analyzed in the same 
way as forensic nurses. They both perform functions primarily for 
the child’s wellbeing and their actions may benefit investigators, 
but neither are principally charged with uncovering and 
prosecuting criminal behavior. Both have the word “forensic” in 
their title, but that word only modifies their title, it is not the 
other way around.168 
Additionally, forensic interviewers want to support good 
decision making by the MDT, but are not beholden to the wishes 
of the MDT. A forensic interviewer is ultimately responsible for 
the interview that she conducts, so while she may seek advice 
from observers of the interview, she is not required to ask 
questions the team may want. Forensic interviewers work for the 
CAC, not the MDT, not law enforcement, and not the prosecutor’s 
office. Interviewers should take caution to make this distinction 
clear. Forensic interviewers have their own responsibility to make 
sure that their interviews adhere to the goals of their own job title 
and do not stray into impermissible territory. Interviewers should 
be careful in how they consult their team when an interview is 
ongoing. Specifically, if the MDT wants the interviewer to ask a 
question that is inappropriate—for whatever reason—the 
interviewer is under no obligation to ask that question and should 
not ask that question. Some interviewers choose to use an  
earpiece when they are interviewing a child. The earpiece is 
connected to a microphone in the room where the MDT is 
observing the interview. This can be helpful for interviews that 
are detail-rich because an interviewer might miss something that 
the team would like clarification about later in the interview. But 
 
166. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015) (“Because the 
teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release [the child] to his 
guardian at the end of the day, they needed to determine who might be 
abusing the child.”). 
167. See id. at 2183. 
168. See INT’L ASS’N OF FORENSIC NURSES, supra note 153. 
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interviewers should ensure that they are still screening questions 
from the MDT appropriately. Earpieces should not turn the 
interviewer into merely a conduit through which the police ask 
questions. An interviewer who allows this would destroy the line 
between a police interview and a forensic interview. Some 
jurisdictions require the forensic interviewer to administer an 
oath that the child will tell the truth.169 These oaths may be 
necessary in some communities, but they will increase the 
likelihood that forensic interviews will produce testimonial 
evidence. Some jurisdictions require law enforcement to be 
present before an interview is conducted, this would also increase 
the likelihood that an interview will create testimonial evidence. 
These jurisdictional choices are not required to conduct a forensic 
interview; a perfectly competent interview may be conducted 
without an oath, earpiece, or presence of law enforcement. 
An objective examination of the circumstances does not show 
that a proper forensic interview is conducted primarily to create 
an out-of-court substitute for testimony. Assuming a forensic 
interview as primarily investigative because it is recorded and 
observed by investigators exhibits a superficial understanding of 
the process. An interview is supposed to support accurate and fair 
decision making by the team.170 A forensic interview may be the 
starting point of the team’s investigation, but it is not the entirety 
of it. It is the investigators’ job to corroborate or disprove the 
allegations made in an interview. The interviewer has no part in 
any of the future investigation. Her training is to gather 
information in a developmentally appropriate way. That 
information may be used in an investigation, but it may also be 
just as useful to mental health clinicians, medical providers, or 
support services. Therefore, statements made to forensic 
interviewers who are part of the CAC—a non-investigative 
agency—are significantly less likely to be testimonial than 
statements made to law enforcement.171 
 
 
169. See, e.g., State v. Dearing, 34 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) 
(where the victim was administered an oath twice agreeing to tell the truth); 
State v. Love, No. E2015-02297-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1077062, at *12  
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017) (where the child was administered an oath 
to tell the truth). 
170. See STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 20. 
171. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182. 
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CONCLUSION 
Think back to Ashley. Try to look at the abuse allegation she 
made to her parents from a layperson’s perspective. As a matter  
of common sense, her remarks seem appropriate for a jury’s 
consideration. Ultimately, the question is about what information 
should be admitted in court if the child cannot testify on her own 
behalf. Under Crawford, if Ashley was unable to testify, her 
statements had no chance of being admitted.172 Davis lends little 
help to Ashley and her family because the “primary purpose” test 
is used only during an ongoing emergency.173 It would be hard to 
argue that driving home on a Sunday afternoon is the kind of 
emergency comparable to the attacks of an abusive partner. 
Bryant cracks the door open slightly to allow the examination of 
“all relevant circumstances.”174 This is the first framework that 
would even entertain a potential argument for the introduction of 
Ashley’s disclosure. The problem with stopping at Bryant and all 
of the previous “testimonial” cases is that they provide almost no 
protection or opportunity for justice for Ashley and children like 
her. A three-year-old is not suited for courtroom testimony, and 
there are few other ways to establish guilt, which is why 
convictions are difficult to obtain. Therefore, young children can 
be easily targeted by those who wish to do them harm because 
criminal consequences are rare. However, the families are not 
shielded from the knowledge of the disclosure, so they endure all 
the pain and familial dysfunction of abuse without a realistic 
chance to get their day in court. This is an unacceptable position 
for children and their caregivers. It is easy to overstate what 
Clark accomplished. Clark only decided that statements by 
children to third-parties who are not law enforcement are 
significantly less likely to be testimonial.175  Clark also reminds  
us that there is evidence to support that statements by children 
about child abuse were never intended to violate the Sixth 
Amendment.176 But ultimately, Clark makes no per se rule, it 
 
172. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (her statements 
appear to be a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.” (citation omitted)). 
173. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
174. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369–70 (2011). 
175. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181. 
176. Id. at 2182. 
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takes no stance on weight, and it says nothing about hearsay. 
Regardless, Clark is an important step to provide more access to 
justice for a group that can do little on their own. Clark empowers 
others to better support children through the rigorous court 
process. Sometimes laws create barriers to justice, but in this  
case, the Supreme Court has formulated a framework that will 
encourage justice. As a result, children will be better protected for 
generations to come. 
